This study uses an unpublished dataset on 515 Chinese industries at the provincial level during 1998-2001 to examine the effect of provincial trade barriers on entry of foreign firms. The analysis is rooted in the new economic geography literature and thus focuses on market and supplier access and additionally controls for availability of infrastructure. We construct measures of local protection based on the size of state-owned sector in own and other provinces adjusted for provincial size and remoteness. Anecdotal evidence suggests that local authorities tend to protect state-owned enterprises which provide employment and tax revenues to their province. As expected, we find that higher protection in both own and other provinces deters foreign entry. We also find that the market size and supplier based in the own province as well as quality of infrastructure positively affect foreign entry.
Introduction
China was the largest recipient of FDI within Asia between 1998 and 2001, receiving US$165 billion of direct investment flows, 1 with over 90 per cent of this investment going to the coastal regions. Strong economic growth experienced by China during this time has not benefitted all provinces equally and thus has resulted in a widening in regional inequality, particularly between the coastal and central regions within China. For instance, while in 1999 the GDP of coastal provinces increased by 7.2%, central and western provinces experienced a growth rate of only 3.8 and 4.7%, respectively. In the same year, coastal provinces accounted for 60% of Chinese GDP and almost three-quarters of national output of manufactured goods. 2 In response to the increasing inequality, the Central Government has introduced a number of different policies, such as the Western Development Project, in order to attract firms to the western regions. Moreover, local governments provide tax incentives to attract FDI in addition to the tax benefits provided by the central government.
Rising inequality between various parts of the country is likely to be exacerbated by high internal trade costs between provinces. Middle and western provinces suffer from high trade costs due to the distances to ports, poor infrastructure and also due to 'local protectionism'. There is evidence to suggest that local governments are erecting provincial border barriers to protect their industries against competition from firms in other provinces. The presence of barriers to inter-provincial trade was reported by a World Bank study (1994 ) and Young (2000) and is consistent with anecdotal evidence. For instance, managers of Chinese firms confirmed that they have indeed experienced some difficulties in accessing markets in other provinces. 3 A manager of a medical manufacturing plant reported that the shipments to other provinces are occasionally stopped by local rail officials for 2 to 4 weeks for no apparent reason. The administrative units of industry and commerce department sometimes make it difficult to access markets in other provinces through audits or local registrations. Because it is illegal to impose trade restrictions, the measures adopted to protect local industries from competition are usually more subtle than a direct border tax, hence it is difficult 1 World Investment Report 2002, Annex Table B3 . 2 See Amiti and Wen (2001) for a discussion on regional inequality in earlier years and the spatial distribution of manufacturing industries in 1995. 3 Interviews with firms and government officials were conducted by Amiti in five different provinces in October 2001. to measure the size and extent of these border barriers directly. Furthermore, there are many different types of costs associated with transporting goods, so it is not a straightforward exercise to calculate how large trade costs are and whether they have been falling over time.
A number of studies, reviewed in the next section, have tried to estimate the size of the border effect and whether it has increased over time. None of these studies have ruled out the existence of provincial border barriers and some have found evidence that such barriers are increasing. The literature estimating the size of the border barriers has been motivated by the concern that barriers are preventing the benefits of specialization. In fact, some studies infer whether border barriers exist by analyzing whether the degree of specialization has increased (see Young, 2000) . However, it is difficult to infer the size of border barriers from specialization patterns since China also engages in trade with the rest of the world; and levels of industry aggregation are usually very high, for example there are 5 sectors in Young's study. While there exists another strand of literature focusing on the effects of government policies, such as the special economic zones, on firm location (see references in the next section), none of them has, however, considered the impact of internal trade costs and trade barriers on firm location decisions, which is the focus of our paper.
High internal trade costs could act as a deterrent to the entry of new firms, particularly those that would rely on domestic input supplies or those that are not export oriented, thus offsetting any potential benefit from tax incentives. In this study we analyze the effect of local protection on the location decisions of new foreign firms in China. We focus on foreign firms rather than domestic firms because their entry decisions are more likely to be influenced by market forces. Given the difficulty in estimating the magnitude of internal trade costs directly, we adopt an indirect and novel approach to address this issue. We hypothesize that local governments have a higher incentive to protect state owned enterprises (SOEs) since they are the largest employers and provide direct revenues to local governments (see Bai et al. 2003 ). We construct a measure of local protection which takes into account the size of market access to other provinces adjusted for the share of the SOEs. We specifically take into account other factors affecting firm's location decisions, such as the availability of inputs and the location of firms in related industries and the size of the market in close proximity. We construct a number of measures of supplier and market access for own province and neighboring provinces.
Our empirical analysis uses information on 515 industries at the provincial level during 1998-2001. The data set provides information on number of foreign firms, SOEs, output, wages and value added. It is an unpublished data set from the China National Bureau of Statistics, which we combine with national input/output tables and Customs data on international trade at the provincial level. In our analysis, we examine factors driving the net entry of foreign firms (i.e., the number of newly established firms less the number of firm exits).
The results show that local protection has a strong negative effect on entry of foreign investors. We find that high shares of SOEs in industries (in other provinces) that a foreign firm will be competing with reduces foreign entry. Moreover, our results indicate that access to supplier base is important only with respect to own province. Presence of suppliers in other provinces has a negative affect on foreign entry, thus suggesting that border barriers may be preventing purchases of inputs from other provinces and hence could be deterring entry into provinces that have inadequate input supplies. These results hold for provinces in the central and western provinces as well as those on the coast, indicating that activities by local governments may be offsetting any other policies aimed at redressing regional inequality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a more detailed review of the related literature. Section 3 develops the formal model. Section 4 provides background information on China and details of the data sources. Section 5 presents the results, and section 6 concludes.
Related Literature
Our paper relates to two strands of literature: one on estimating the size of provincial border effects in China; and the other on determinants of FDI in China. The studies on border effects have produced mixed results. The findings of Poncet (2003) and Young (2002) suggest that inter-provincial trade barriers have been increasing over time, between 1978 and 1997. Poncet uses a gravity approach to estimate the border effect, a methodology that requires inter-provincial trade data. Unfortunately this data does not exist for China, so her estimation is based on the inter-China trade figures constructed from provincial input/output tables, providing information on each province's trade with the rest of China and foreign countries, rather than bilateral provincial trade figures. Young (2000) analyses the changes in specialization patterns using 5 sector groupings and found the degree of specialization had decreased. He also considers movements in prices, but is concerned about the quality of that data, and found that there had been some divergence for part of the sample period and then no clear trend. These findings lead Young to conclude that border barriers have increased. However, it is difficult to deduce that barriers have increased given the high aggregation of the data and the effects of China's trade with the rest of the world. For example, even though specialization might decrease at the aggregate manufacturing level, different provinces could be specializing in different types of manufacturing industries.
In contrast to these studies, Naughton (1999) 4 The prices in their sample converged during the 1990s, with the rate of convergence increasing in the more recent period. They use price data for 44 goods in 35 cities for the period 1990 to 1997: 7 consumer food products such as eggs and flour and 37 producer products including 34 industrial raw materials and 3 different models of trucks. Bai et al (2003) , find that specialization patterns initially fell but then increased significantly, using a data set with 32 two digit industries at the provincial level in China for 13 years (1985-1997) . They hypothesize that local governments are more likely to protect industries with a high degree of SOE and high profit-tax margins, and they do find that the degree of specialization is lower for these types of industries thus confirming their hypotheses.
In sum, none of the studies seem to deny the existence of provincial border barriers in China. The controversy is about the direction of change in these barriers. Poncet and Young argue that the border effects have increased over time, with the two studies spanning 1980 to 1997; whereas Bai, Naughton and Huang and Wei argue that border barriers have fallen, particularly in the latter part of the studies ie mid to late 1990s. Given the difficulty of ascertaining the magnitude and the direction of change in border barriers, the DRC and the World Bank have undertaken an extensive survey of firms and local government officials.
The second strand of literature on the determinants of FDI in China has found that foreign firms are attracted to provinces with good infrastructure and preferential policies. Some studies have used individual firm level entry data from the Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade. This would be the ideal data to use if it were a complete set or covered a large sample. Unfortunately, it only covers around 10% of new foreign firms that are joint ventures and it is unclear how these firms were selected. Furthermore, this information stopped being published in 1996. Two studies that utilize this data are Head and Ries (1996) and Dean, Lovely and Wang (2002) . Although the entry information is at the firm level, their explanatory variables utilize highly aggregated data. Detailed information on supplier access are not included. The potential suppliers are proxied by the number of industrial enterprises and the value of industrial output only within a province, so it is assumed that firms buy all their inputs locally. Dean, Lovely and Wang (2002) examine whether FDI is attracted to "pollution havens" in Chinese provinces using a similiar approach to Head and Ries. . Other studies use more aggregated data. Cheng and Kwan (2000) use aggregated FDI stocks by province to estimate a partial adjustment model of the determinants of the location of FDI in China over the period 1985 to 1995. They find that per capita income, good infrastructure and preferential policies had a positive effect. Note they do not take account of any spatial issues, trade costs or input linkages.
Theory
We derive our estimating equation from a new economic geography model, based on Krugman and Venables (1995) and Amiti (2003) . Firms are assumed to compete in a monopolistically competitive environment, with each firm producing a differentiated variety. All varieties of final goods enter symmetrically into the consumer's utility function and all varieties of intermediate inputs enter symmetrically in the firm's cost function. Profits of a single representative firm in industry i in province p are given by
The total cost function comprises a fixed cost, F , a constant cost, b i , and factor prices, where w p is the wage in province p, 5 r p is the price of capital in province p or any other factor of production, and P u p is the intermediate input price index. It is defined as.
The transport cost, t i lp , of shipping a good from province l to p is modelled as Samuelsonian iceberg costs, with t ≥ 1. This means that a proportion of imported inputs, 1 − 1 t , melts in transit. Hence, to deliver one unit of any good from one province to another t units must be shipped as only a fraction 1 t arrives. If t = 1 there is free trade and if t = ∞ there is no trade. We will model the total transport cost of shipping a good from p to l as a function of distance, d pl .
The fob producer price is given by profit maximization, which gives the usual marginal revenue equals marginal cost condition, with prices proportional to marginal cost.
The mark-up over marginal cost, θ i , depends on the elasticity of substitution σ i . Output of each firm in industry i in province p, x i p is sold to consumers and firms located within a province p, to other provinces in China and to the rest of the world. Product market clearing conditions give
Demand for industry i goods produced in province p is given by
Expenditure on industry i, E i , not only comes from consumers but also from downstream firms,
Downstream firms spend a proportion µ of their total revenue, n
l , on goods produced by industry i (the second term in equation 3.6). Demand from downstream firms is derived using Shepard's lemma on the price index (as shown in Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) .
Summing across all locations within China and the rest of the world, we derive aggregate demand, and setting it equal to supply gives
Substituting in the product market clearing condition (3.7) and the profit maximizing price (3.3) into the profit function, 3.1, gives 
It is assumed that free entry and exit of firms ensures zero profits in equilibrium. Firms enter when profits are positive and exit when profits are negative. Although the Krugman and Venables (1995) model is static, we can generalize it to a dynamic model for the purposes of estimation. As in the original model, any exogenous changes to, say, trade costs would affect profits and hence the number of firms in each location. We hypothesize that there will be entry in industry i in province p when profits are positive, hence the change in the number of firms is positively related to profits:
Thus in our empirical analysis we include average wages varying by province and time. The theory predicts a negative coefficient on wages, that is other things equal, firms prefer to locate in provinces that offer lower wages. The provincial specific effects r p could include any other factors that affect the cost of production that vary across provinces. We include a number of infrastructure type variables, such as, the number of sea berths, riverberths and lengths of railroads. We hypothesize that profits are positively related to better access to intermediate inputs, which are reflected in a lower intermediate input price index, P u p and this variable is affected by internal and external trade costs, which we will proxy by three different supplier access variables; and that firms are also concerned about good market access, reflected in the last term, which we will proxy by various market access variables.
Variables

Supplier Access
An important consideration for many firms is the ease of access to inputs. We construct three measures of supplier access. First,
where Y k p,t is the output of industry k produced in province p at time t. It is divided by the total output of industry k produced in China, to get the share of output of each industry k produced in each province. Since industries use more than one intermediate input, these output shares are weight by a ik , which are the coefficients from the China national input-output table for 1997. Of course, firms can also purchase inputs from other provinces and from abroad. The availability of intermediate inputs in the rest of China is proxied by
This is analogous to the own province supplier access measure. To take account of the additional cost of accessing inputs from other provinces, we weight the output shares produced in each province by the inverse of distance from province p to province l. As well as representing the actual freight costs of transporting intermediate inputs, this measure could also reflect local protectionism.
The importance of intermediate supplies from the rest of the world is proxied by trade weighted tariffs imposed by China on imported intermediate inputs weighted by the input/output coefficient a ik to reflect the fact that relative importance of inputs varies by industry
(3.13)
It should be noted that many industries in China have access to duty free intermediate inputs through duty drawbacks and hence would not be affected by tariffs on intermediate inputs. Nonetheless, there are many industries that do pay these tariffs 7 and thus it is important to include this variable in the estimation. We hypothesize that SA_own i p,t should have a positive effect on entry of foreign firms. We expect that SA_outer i p,t would have a positive effect on entry if there were no restrictions to trade between provinces, however provincial border barriers could result in a negative coefficient on this variable. The variable SA_abroad i p,t should have a negative effect on entry.
Market Access
Another important consideration for firms in choosing where to locate is good access to large markets. We construct three measures of market access to reflect that firms can sell to consumers within their own province, in other provinces and to the rest of the world. 8 The own market access measure is defined as
where DY p,t is disposable income in province p at time t divided by total disposable income in China. Similarly, market access to the rest of China is defined as
Approximately 40 per cent of imports are subject to tariffs. 8 Note that firms can also sell to other firms, however this information is not yet included in our estimation.
where each province's share of disposable income is weighted by the inverse of distance. Many foreign firms use China as an export platform, so tariffs imposed on China by the rest of the world might also be a consideration:
(3.16)
We hypothesize that MA_own p,t should have a positive effect on entry; MA_outer i p,t should also have a positive effect on entry if access to other provinces is possible; and high tariffs on China's exports of industry i 0 s products might deter entry.
Protection
In an effort to assess the effects of local protection on entry we construct two measures based on the importance of state-owned enterprises in different provinces, as captured by their share in total provincial output, since there is some evidence suggesting that local governments are more likely to protect SOEs. Our first measure is defined as
where Y SOE p,t is the total output produced by state-owned enterprises in province p at time t and Y p,t is the total manufacturing output produced by all firms in province p. Provinces with high shares of SOEs may want to discourage foreign entry into their province to shelter state-owned enterprises from additional competition. This measure may also be capturing the fact that provinces where SOEs account for most of the output have fewer attractive joint venture partners to offer.
In an attempt to capture the difficulty firms may have in selling their competing goods to other provinces we define an additional variable
where
is the proportion of an industry i 0 s output that is produced by state-owned enterprises in province p. We hypothesize that the higher the share of output produced by SOEs in location l and industry i, the larger the incentive to protect the industry against competition and hence the more difficult it will be for firms located in province p to sell in those markets; and the larger the economic size of neighboring provinces, the stronger the deterrent effect to entry. Of course, the farther away these provinces are located the less effect they will have on incentives to enter. As already mentioned, many foreign firms enter China to take advantage of lower production costs and use the country as an export platform. To such firms both access to imported inputs as well as easiness of shipping their products out are of key importance. To proxy for these factors, we include in the model a measure of provincial openness to trade, defined as the ratio of provincial exports and imports to provincial GDP. We expect to find that more open provinces would attract more entry.
Data
The industrial data are based on census type unpublished annual figures provided by the China National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The original data set includes 600 industries by province from 1998 to 2001, based on the 4 digit Chinese Industrial Classification. It is not possible to include earlier years in the sample because data on the number of foreign firms was unavailable. Our sample includes 515 industries as the NBS removed all 'sensitive industries' from the sample and we excluded agriculture, extractive industries and services. The variables include the number of foreign firms, output of foreign firms, as well as information on the total number of firms that have sales above a minimum level. For each industry, there is information on the total wage bill, employment, output and value added. The input/output table is at the national level for 1997. We use the input-output data to construct the supplier access variables and assume that the technology is constant throughout the sample period. There is variation in the supplier access variables due to entry and exit of firms. There are 70 manufacturing I/O codes, which we concord with the industrial data. Thus, while we analyze entry at the 515 industry level our proxies for supplier access are defined for 70 I/O codes. The trade data at the 4 digit level of the Harmonized System (HS) come from Chinese Customs Office and include around 2000 industries by province and by type of firm (i.e., foreign or domestic).
Provincial characteristics such as the number of river and sea berths, disposable income and population size are all from the China Annual Statistical Yearbook. We include all locations in China except Tibet and Inner Mongolia because the latter two have very little industrial activity. This gives us 29 locations comprising 25 provinces and 4 directly administered cities: Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin and Chongqing. Table 1 provides summary statistics of all the variables.
As illustrated in the Appendix Charts, a vast majority of foreign entry in 2001 occurred in coastal provinces. Seven out of twelve provinces in the coastal region increased the number of foreign investment projects by more than a hundred. Guangdong and Zhejiang were the most successful provinces increasing the number of foreign investment enterprises (FIEs) by about 600 each. In contrast, no province in the mid or western region received more than 40 new projects and in several provinces (Hellongjiang, Shanxi, Ningxia) the number of FIEs actually went down.
In terms of distribution of net entry (i.e., entry -exit) across industries, both sectors producing consumer goods and industrial parts and components appeared to be attractive to foreign investors. The former group includes paper products, household plastic products, lamps and lanterns, cotton knitting, while in the latter category we find electronic elements and automobile fittings and parts. In 2000 and 2001 manufacturing of clothing (classification 1810) experienced the largest rise in the number of foreign projects (260 and 160, respectively).
FIEs account for a significant share of industrial output produced in China. In 2001 their share in total production was equal to 31.3 percent. The share of FIEs in provincial output ranged from 2.4 percent in Xinjiang to 65 percent in Fujian, 61 in Guangdong and 58 in Tianjin in 2001. In twenty sectors (out of 515 considered in our sample), foreign enterprises accounted for three-quarters or more of industrial output produced in China in 2001. These included some technology intensive industries, such as manufacturing of copying machines, computers, cameras and instruments, communication equipment, radio and tape recorders, integrated circuits as well as consumer good industries-processing of fish sauce and production of soft drinks.
Results
In our regression analysis, we define the dependent variable to be the net entry of foreign firms in industry i in province p at time t. This variable is positive if the number of firms that entered is greater than the number of firms that exited; zero if there has been no change or the number of new firms exactly equals the number of exiting firms; and negative if the number of new firms is less than the number of exiting firms. The explanatory variables are in natural logs. All of the results presented include 4 digit industry specific effects and year dummies. Table 2 presents the results from the base specification which does not include the protection measures. The first column of each estimation is with regional fixed effects, with China divided into three regions -coastal, central and westthe dummies are relative to the coast; and the second column includes provincial fixed effects. The first two columns include all observations for completeness, but in all the estimations that follow we only focus on the non-negative net entry observations, thus excluding all the negative net entry observations.
The factors affecting entry decisions are unlikely to be the same as the exit decisions. There are a number of factors that would induce exit for which we are unable to control. For example, in interviews with policy officials in one of China's provinces it was revealed that they expect 60 to 70% of all joint ventures to fail within the next year or so due to difficulties that foreign firms experience in getting along with their Chinese partners, particularly with SOEs which may be less flexible in their work practices. Another factor affecting exit that is difficult to control for is the incentives that the preferential tax system may provide. For example, new foreign firms are entitled to tax free benefits in the first two years of operation, enjoy a 50% tax reduction in the next three years, and only in following years are responsible for the full tax payments. These benefits may give firms incentives to either change their name or location in order to receive the benefits again. Although this goes against the spirit of the tax package, local government officials may turn a blind eye to such schemes in order to attract foreign investors. 9 Since it is not possible to control for the above mentioned factors affecting exit, we will restrict our sample to non-negative net entry observations. The comparison of the estimation results for the full sample (columns (1) and (2)) with those for non-negative net entry (columns (3) and (4)) suggests that this restriction does not induce any selection bias as the estimates are very similar across both samples. The main difference is the significance level of some of the variables.
In all four specifications we find, as expected, that own supplier access bears a positive and significant coefficient and thus has a positive effect on net entry, suggesting that good access to intermediate inputs suppliers in the own province is an important factor in the decision to enter. When provincial fixed effects are added to the model the coefficient on own supplier access increases from 0.05 to 0.11 (in columns 3 and 4) indicating that improvement in supplier access have a bigger effect on entry than levels of supplier access. The effect of outer supplier access is negative and significant. This variable is defined as the share of production of inputs used by industry i that is produced in other provinces. If it were easy to access inputs produced in other provinces, we would expect to find a positive coefficient. The fact that outer supplier access has a negative effect on entry suggests that firms face difficulties with accessing inputs from neighboring provinces and therefore the fact that many suppliers are located in other provinces deters entry. Hence the negative sign can be interpreted as evidence of local protection having a detrimental effect on entry. Average tariffs in intermediate inputs is also negative and significant, indicating that high tariffs on intermediate inputs do discourage entry.
The market access variable, proxied by share of disposable income, is positive and significant in all columns with the exception of column (4) where it is insignificant. Similarly, market access in other provinces is positive and significant in column (3) but insignificant in column (4). Since column (4) presents results from a model with provincial fixed effects the loss of significance may be attributed to the fact that these variables do not change much over the short period of time covered by our sample. The market access abroad variable bears the expected negative sign but is insignificant in all of the estimations, indicating that tariffs imposed by the rest of the world on Chinese exports do not affect foreign entry. The lack of significance may be due to several reasons. First, while tariffs vary from country to country our measure captures the average tariff imposed by all countries and thus is an imperfect measure of market access. Second, some foreign investment enterprises may be operating under outward processing schemes and thus not be subject to tariffs in their export markets.
The cost of production and availability of infrastructure are also important elements in choosing where to locate. As anticipated, the average provincial wage is negative and significant. Electricity prices have a positive sign in the estimations without provincial fixed effects and a negative sign with provincial fixed effects. It is possible that electricity prices capture other factors, such as the level of industrialization of a province, which are not controlled for in the regression. For instance, highly industrialized provinces such as Shanghai have relatively high electricity prices but provide many other benefits as a location for foreign firms such as availability of skilled labor or high quality of service industries. When we include provincial fixed effects, these other factors capturing time-invariant attractiveness of the province are washed away and we find that increases in electricity prices deter entry. Surprisingly, total population is negative in all the estimations. Normally, population would be another indicator of market size but in China some provinces are very populous and very poor and thus do not offer high demand for goods produced by foreign firms. The positive and significant coefficient on the openness variable indicates that the more open a province is to international trade the more attractive it is -this effect is stronger with provincial fixed effects. Access to sea berths and river berths also attract entry but these effects are swept into the provincial fixed effects in column 4. The length of rail is positive and significant, indicating that good infrastructure is an important variable. As an additional proxy for the quality of investment climate, we include the lagged number of foreign firms operating in each province. As expected, we find a positive and significant coefficient on this variable.
Next we explore how local protection affects entry decision of foreign firms. In the first two columns of Table 3 we presents the results from a model including prot_soe, which is defined as the share of output produced by SOEs in a given province in a given year. In both specification the variable bears the expected negative sign and is statistically significant suggesting that a larger size of the SOE sector is negatively correlated with foreign entry. This is consistent with our hypothesis that greater prominence of state-owned enterprises, which provide employment to the population and tax revenues to provincial authorities, may give the local government an incentive to shelter SOEs from additional competition by deterring foreign entry. In the next two specifications, we include the proxy for protection imposed by other provinces on sales of industry i0s output produced in province p in their markets (MA_prot i p,t ), which is derived based on importance of SOEs in a given sector taking into account the economic size and remoteness of each province. As expected, the variable bears a negative sign but is significant only when provincial fixed effects are excluded. The lack of significance in the specification with provincial fixed effects may be due to short span of time covered by our sample and thus little variation in the measure over time. In the last two columns of Table 3 , both proxies for protection are included. Again we find that higher levels of protection in both own province as well as in other provinces have a negative effect on foreign entry but the protection imposed by other provinces is not significant when provincial fixed effects are included.
In Table 4 we explore whether the same factors influence foreign entry decisions in coastal provinces and other parts of the country. The results presented in the first two columns allow the protection measures to differ between the two regions. In the next two columns the supplier access variables are interacted with regional dummies and in the last two columns the coefficients on market access variables are allowed to differ. We find that protection in own province negatively affects foreign entry in all regions, but protection imposed by other provinces only matters for investors locating in the coastal zone. As for the supplier access, the negative effect of SA_outer is statistically significant for all regions implying that barriers to purchasing intermediate inputs from other provinces deter foreign investment all over China. On the other hand, presence of suppliers in own province and tariffs on imported inputs matter only in the coastal zone. This may be due to the fact that more suppliers are located on the coast and that the coast, thanks to its geographic location, is better positioned to rely on imported inputs. Finally, we find that market access is important to foreign investors locating in all parts of China. This is true for market size of own as well as other provinces. Tariffs imposed by foreign countries, on the other hand, do not seem to affect the entry decision.
Conclusion
Our results, based on the econometric analysis of foreign entry into 515 industries during 1999-2001, suggest that local protection is a strong factor discouraging entry of foreign firms into China. Local protection may deter foreign investors by hindering their access to local producers of intermediate inputs located in other provinces or by restricting their ability to sell their products in neighboring provinces or in other parts of China. These conclusions are based on our findings indicating that the availability of intermediate inputs and access to large markets are important factors determining the locational choices of foreign firms. In particular, we show that provinces offering good supply of intermediate inputs attracts new entry, but high prominences of SOE in own province or being close to provinces with large markets that have a large share of SOE deters entry. Local governments tend to protect the SOE sector either by discouraging the entry of new firms or by restricting market access in competing industries. Moreover, we find that access to international markets is an important factor in entry decisions. Provinces that have good access to sea and river berths and are open to international trade attract more foreign entry. These factors are robust across different specifications and are important for coastal and non-coastal provinces.
If China's central government is serious about redressing regional inequality, it must address the issue of local protection. Dismantling inter-provincial barriers will increase market and supplier access for both Chinese and foreign producers, attracting entry of new firms, allowing provinces to follow their comparative advantage in the production structure and thus resulting in more efficient allocation of resources and more balanced growth across regions.
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